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Abstract 
 
Our work examines the relationship between knowledge/familiarity with shale gas development in a comparative context. The Uni ted States (US) and United 
Kingdom (UK) represent very different cases of shale gas development, with development relatively mature in the US whilst, no extraction of shale gas has yet 
commenced in the UK. Comparing results from two national level survey efforts in 2014, we ﬁnd higher levels of knowledge abou t the shale gas industry in the UK 
than in the US, as well as higher levels of support in the US (opposition levels were similar, but US respondents were much less likely than UK respondents to say that 
they did not know whether they supported or opposed development). With respect  to the relationship between knowledge and support, increased knowledge in the UK 
is associated with increased support, while knowledge was unrelated to support in the US. We anchor these results within the inf ormation deﬁcit model of science, 
suggesting that concentrated media and governance in the UK have played an important role in producing the demonstrated effects. 
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1. Background 
Our work examines the relationship between knowledge/familiarity with shale gas and attitudes towards shale gas industry development in a 
comparative context. The United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) represent very different cases of shale gas development. Shale gas development 
is a relatively mature industry in the US, with extraction via hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) occurring in many shale gas plays (e.g., the Marcellus in 
the Northeast, the Barnett in Texas, the Bakken in North Dakota, and others).  In  direct  contrast,  although  the  UK does  produce  a small amount of 
onshore gas from other reservoir rocks, no extraction of shale gas has yet commenced; fewer than ten test wells (9 to be exact) have been drilled to date 
in the UK (http:// frack-off.org.uk/extreme-energy-fullscreen/).1 Despite the lack of actual shale gas development, dialogue about shale gas extraction 
has been no less lively in the UK (e.g. [4,11,56] than in the US [14,2], 
Much of the conversation about shale gas development in the UK has tended to focus broadly on whether it will obtain positive or negative 
impacts and why (as opposed to how to manage speciﬁc aspects of development). This conversation, thus, points   to whether development should 
or should not occur [4,25,52]. In the US, mass media discourse and community conversations often focus more frequently on nuances of how to 
deal with perceived positive and negative outcomes [45,46] of development than on whether to encourage or resist it. Because the evolution of shale 
gas development is still relatively early, the UK may have a great deal to learn from the US when considering whether and how to approach shale 
gas development, although several key differences need to be considered that reﬂect the different contexts in which development is occurring and/or 
may occur. 
There exist important contrasts between the US and the UK that suggest the need for comparative analysis. These contrasts begin with private, 
dispersed vs. nationally concentrated ownership of mineral rights. In much of the US, rights to subsurface resources are owned by the landowner. 
Especially in the Northeast US, where private land is relatively more abundant than the west, this means that it is quite common for individual 
private landowners to own the mineral rights. As such, the potential for individual landowners to potentially proﬁt economically from shale gas 
development is dramatic (see Kinnaman [27] for a cogent review). This proﬁt potential is especially salient in contexts of persistent rural poverty. 
‘Split estates’ (where the current or past landowner has sold the subsurface rights) are also relatively common [1], especially in the South and 
Midwest. There also has been substantial development on government land—these government bodies then own the mineral rights in these 
contexts, and may enact additional regulations [35]. This is especially common in the western US, which is proportionately more dominated by 
public lands. 
The situation is comparatively much simpler in the UK: all mineral rights are vested to the Crown: although individual landowners may still receive 
some revenues from access fees, their potential economic returns are not of the magnitude found in the US. This key difference can affect views of 
energy development, as landowners in shale gas extracting regions within the US potentially have much to gain through leasing their drilling rights 
[7], thus potentially polarizing discourse and also resulting in greater framing of the issue in the US of one as potentially enhancing the well-being  of 
rural people and communities in shale gas regions (e.g. [6,10]). While these economic beneﬁts are far from agreed-upon [39,34], the point we wish to 
emphasize here is that the potential for these beneﬁts has affected the discourse surrounding shale gas development [19] in a way that differs from the  
UK. 
This difference in ownership also means that mineral  rights are leased in a highly decentralized manner in the  US  [16,53]  with myriad individual 
landowners (or coalitions of landowners, see Jacquet and Stedman [24] making decisions across time and space. The opposite occurs in the UK, where 
leasing happens at the national level and is conducted by the government via awarding   of licenses covering vast areas. This latter point will be re-
engaged below. Accompanying and complementing this decentralized leasing in the US is fragmented governance [58]. In the US, states  retain the 
majority of control over regulation; some have granted municipalities varying levels of oversight over development (e.g., Pennsylvania) while others 
have retained all governance capacity centrally (e.g., Ohio). In the UK, with the exception of devolved powers to the Scottish Parliament, Parliament 
in Westminster has the ultimate authority over  regulation.2 
Governance has further shaped the stage on which shale gas-related discourse has played out. As with ownership and governance, discourse has 
occurred much more at a national level in the UK compared with the US [11,56]. The plurality and diversity of regulations in the US have fostered 
much more regionally-centered discourse in areas exposed to development or with the potential for development. Also contributing to this relationship 
is the nature of the media: the print media in the UK it is overwhelmingly national, compared to viable local/regional print media in the US. Coupling 
this with the potential for rural development impacts of shale gas development has resulted in shale gas emerging as a very salient local/regional issue 
by local/regional/rural media [14] in the US. 
In contrast, Williams et al. [56] suggest that UK institutional actors have helped to create a more centralized discourse “. . .in which the policy 
approach is deﬁned through a deﬁcit model of public understanding of science and in which a technical approach to feasibility and safety is deemed 
as sufﬁcient grounds for good [centralized] policymaking.” They suggest (p. 4) that this “supports a policy story-line in which the sole legitimate 
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barriers to achieving ‘real public support’ are seen to be a failure on the part of the public to recognise the beneﬁts of fracking and to be reassured 
by institutional commitments to effective risk assessment and management.” In this vein, Whitmarsh et al. [54] (420) note that “The Royal Society 
[38] concludes the safety and environmental risks of hydraulic fracturing are low and manageable through best practice and enforcement of UK 
regulations. They also recommend under- standing public acceptability of shale gas extraction and use in the context of energy, environmental and 
economic policies be considered a priority for UK research.” 
In  the  UK,  the  science  underlying  hydraulic  fracturing  is seen as essentially sound; what is lacking is public recognition, understanding, and 
acceptance of this well-established, centrally produced science. The implicit (at times explicit) framework here  is that greater understanding will 
promote greater acceptance. Whitmarsh et al. continue, stating that the Royal Society also prioritizes understanding and fostering public acceptability 
of shale gas extraction and use. Similarly, the International Energy Agency concludes shale gas operators require a ‘social l icense to operate’ (see 
also O’Hara et al. [32]). Speciﬁcally, one key goal of the UK Ofﬁce of Unconventional Gas and Oil (OUGO) is to ‘support public engagement’, 
described as ‘helping people understand the facts about unconventional gas and oil production and what it could mean  if it takes place in their area’ 
[12]. Williams et al. [56] continue (p. 4): “The UK Prime Minister David Cameron adopted this rhetoric when he suggested that ‘[i]f neighbourhoods 
can see the beneﬁts 
– and are reassured about its effects on the environment – then I don’t see why fracking shouldn’t receive real public support’ [8]. Cotton et al. [56] 
note that the combination of central government rhetoric and growing grassroots activism makes shale gas a matter of national public policy debate, 
and notes Cameron’s emphasis [8] in the Telegraph newspaper, stating: ‘Fracking has become a national debate in Britain—and it’s one that I’m 
determined to win.’ 
 
2. Literature review 
 
Among the myriad comparisons between the US and the UK, which we could address, we focus in particular on the relationship between 
familiarity/knowledge about shale gas and support/opposition for development of the industry. 
 
2.1. Knowledge and support for shale gas: comparative studies 
 
There is a well-established precedent for exploring the relation- ship between knowledge and support for shale gas development and how that 
relationship varies across contexts. Within the North American context, there has been a robust body of work comparing perceptions of shale gas 
across states/provinces [5,29,30,46] and within states [23,28,49]. Our study in particular builds upon previous work (e.g. [46,6]) that compared views 
of unconventional gas development across two US states within the Marcellus Shale region: New York, where there remains a statewide ban on 
drilling, and Pennsylvania, where drilling has been proceeding for a decade or more. The study (a mail survey) focused only on residents within the 
Marcellus shale region itself. Stedman et al. [46] found (p. 386) “Despite nearly a decade of gas development in the Marcellus Shale region of 
Pennsylvania and the associated media coverage, respondents from both states generally reported knowing relatively little about the potential impacts 
of gas drilling. Moreover, the response patterns of Pennsylvania and New York residents did not differ signiﬁcantly from one another in their self-
assessed knowledge.” Respondents in this study also expressed that they knew relatively little about particular elements of development, such as 
drilling procedures, legal implications of leasing, government regulations, environmental impacts, economic impacts, and other topics. Again, the 
authors found that Pennsylvania and New York respondents did not differ in their self-assessed knowledge, despite the presumed differences in 
exposure to the industry. Pennsylvania respondents in this study were also slightly more likely, on the whole, to support further shale gas development 
(47% vs 41% in New York). Although not willing to suggest a causal relationship between exposure and support, the study demonstrated that exposure 
to the industry (rather loosely operationalised, however, by residence in an active drilling play, versus not) is not associated with greater self-assessed 
knowledge, but is associated with slightly greater support. 
At least in a preliminary way, these ﬁndings suggest that more exposure does not necessarily lead to greater familiar- ity/knowledge, thus opening 
the door to making these comparisons at a broader scale: across nations. An even more recent study in the UK [54], although not explicitly comparative 
across regions, echoed the policy rhetoric described earlier, ﬁnding a positive relationship between knowledge about shale gas development and positive 
attitudes/support for development. The researchers varied information experimentally and found that providing additional information to respondents 
was associated with more positive attitudes, regardless of whether the information was framed in positive or negative terms. 
 
2.2. Knowledge and support of risky technology: the information deﬁcit model and its discontents 
 
Our review concatenates previous work on the relationship between knowledge and support of potentially risky technologies such as shale gas 
development. Industries such as unconventional gas development can be framed as technological risks ([15,18,42,57] for an explicit  framing  of  shale  
gas  development in this vein). Often, responses to technological risks, particularly oppositional responses, are analyzed as properties of individuals: 
i.e., through their use of heuristics [50,17], or emotion [44]. Commonly, overcoming public opposition to such technological risks   is thus seen as 
accomplished via cognitive-based models whereby attitudes are changed via the provision of information [43]. This has come to be known as the 
“information deﬁcit” [20,33,47] or “educating the public” [21] model, whereby the provision of information about the risky technology or scientiﬁc 
enterprise is thought to allay concerns and generate support among a previously “irrational” public [51]. Additional information, so the logic goes, 
helps to reduce this supposed irrationality. This model therefore implicitly (or even explicitly) asserts that attitudes are based primarily on information, 
are relatively easy to change with the provision of additional information, and are tightly linked to relevant behavior [21]. 
Miller [33] asserts that that the deﬁcit model fails to deliver on its promises. Sturgis and Allum ([47] p. 56) note that “the deﬁcit model has come 
in for sustained criticism on a number of grounds”, including the assumption that fear is primarily based on a lack of knowledge, neglecting that risks 
are given attention based on link- ages to cultural assumptions (see Douglas and Wildavsky [13]); biased measures used to measure knowledge; and 
the importance of social trust as underpinning risk. Heberlein [21] conﬁrms that most of the underlying assumptions he reveals regarding the 
relationship between information, attitudes, and behaviors do not hold up to scientiﬁc scrutiny: the public is often not irrational, nor are attitudes easily 
changed with the provision of additional information, nor are they often strongly related to risk-related behaviors (see also Peters [31]). 
More broadly, numerous challenges have been raised regarding risk perceptions as the properties of individuals (e.g. [13,26,36,37,55], but instead 
are culturally and socially rooted, noting the importance of social agreements in shaping what risks are selected for attention, but also the importance 
of social context in shaping these risks. In moving towards what becomes their “contextualist” argument, Sturgis and Allum [47] p. 57 nicely articulate 
that [although these] “criticisms [of the deﬁcit model] are undoubtedly in many ways valid, they do not, in our view, sufﬁciently problematize the 
deﬁcit model to justify scrapping it entirely. Indeed, we ﬁnd it puzzling that many scholars utilizing survey research methods that consistently uncover 
associations between knowledge of and attitudes towards science, despite controlling for a range of other important characteristics such as age, 
education, and social class, often choose to ignore this  ﬁnding.” 
 
 3 
 
 
3. Research rationale, questions and methods 
 
3.1. Rationale 
 
The contextualist perspective described above provides a solid foundation for our comparative approach to assessing the relation- ship between 
knowledge and attitudes. Our engagement is based on our own healthy skepticism for the information deﬁcit model: we agree with many of the 
theoretical critiques raised above, and note the results speciﬁc to shale gas development in the US that also challenge the assumptions of this model. 
However, a different story seems to emerge in the UK sources engaged herein, where greater knowledge does appear to be linked to greater trust in 
science and concomitant perceived risk. We have also engaged how the shale gas question appears to manifest differently across the two con- texts 
with respect to policy and media coverage, which – in the  UK 
– appear to be tipped more towards concerted, concentrated efforts to gain increased acceptance. Our research therefore engages the question of how 
context affects the relationship between, knowledge, and support. We focus herein on the centralized discourse and programmatic efforts in the UK  
that  emphasized  educating the public about science in general and about shale gas development in particular. This institutional rhetoric within the 
UK ﬁts well with the deﬁcit model we engage: central authority in the UK has explicitly adopted an information deﬁcit model that is explicitly pro-
science and pro-shale gas. This has been much less the case in the US with more decentralized (regional, state level) governance and no clear central 
message. 
 
3.2. Research questions 
 
Emerging from the review above, we ask four questions in our work: 
 
1. What is the level of knowledge about shale gas development,  and how does it differ between the general population of the US and the UK? 
2. What socio-demographic attributes are associated with know edge? 
3. What is the overall level of support for shale gas development, and how does it differ between the general population of the US and the UK? 
4. What is the relationship between knowledge and support and how does it differ between the general population of the US and the UK? 
 
3.3. Research methods 
 
Parallel questions were asked on two national level surveys, one each in the US and the UK. Within the UK, the University of (name removed for 
blind review) has been conducting a national survey since March 2012 (see name removed for blind review). At the time of our research, the survey 
had been administered 10 times between then and September 2014, and has allowed tracking of ﬁne scale changes over time. It has been administered 
through “YouGov” (https://yougov.co.uk/opi/),  a  panel  sampling  ﬁrm,  resulting  in 
 
Table 1 
Administration Dates and Sample Size of UK Survey.Table 2 
Knowledge Differences between the US and the UK. 
 
 
US Respondents UK Respondents 
 
 N (%)  N (%)  
Shale Gas (Correct) 425 33.4  2766 72.3  
Boromic Gas 22 1.7  37 1.0  
Coal 188 14.7  227 5.9  
Xenon Gas 23 1.8  26 0.7  
Tar-sand Oil 107 8.4  54 1.4  
Don’t Know 510 40.0  714 18.7  
 
Date of survey # of respondents 
18th–20th March 2012 2784 
26th–30th  April 2012 2791 
17th–19th June 2012 2687 
13th–14th December 2012 3530 
14th–18th March 2013 3697 
30th June–2nd July 2013 2126 
20th–24th September 2013 3688 
22nd–24th  January 2014 3751 
11th–13th May 2014 3657 
9th–11th September 2014 3822 
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nationally representative panel data3 (with respect to attributes such as gender, age, region, ethnicity, income). The sample size has ranged from ∼2500 
to 3800 respondents per offering (Table 1). 
Within the United States, name removed for blind review University replicated key questions on the continuing UK YouGov survey conducted in 
September 2014 as part of a larger survey effort examining national perspectives on shale gas. For our key variables – knowledge and support/opposition 
– we used the exact wording  of the UK YouGov survey to maximize comparability. This study utilized a Qualtrics panel (http://www.qualtrics.com/) 
of a nation- ally representative4 sample (n = 1625) regarding key comparison attributes of age, gender, and state-by-state population distribution. 
The items that form the crux of our analysis include the following: Knowledge was measured via a multiple choice item “This is a fossil fuel, found 
in sedimentary rock normally more than 1000 metres below ground. It is extracted using a technique known as hydraulic fracturing, or ‘fracking’. Is 
this fossil fuel:” a) Boromic gas, b) Coal, c) Xenon gas, d) Shale gas, e) Tar-sand oil, or f) Don’t know. Prior to the US team’s involvement (prior to 
fall, 2014), UK respondents who answered incorrectly or responded that they did not know were excluded from the remainder of the survey. At the 
request of the US researchers, the UK researchers agreed to change this protocol to retain those who answered incorrectly or stated that they did not 
know (otherwise, our assessment of the relationship between knowledge and support would be impossible). 
Support/opposition was also measured via a single item “Do you think that extracting natural gas from shale in the [UK/US] should or should not 
be allowed?” In the UK, the response options with the a 3 category response metric: (1) Should be allowed; (2) Should  NOT 
be allowed; (3) Don’t know. Because attitudes are nearly always more nuanced than simple dichotomies, this question was asked  on a 5 category scale 
in the US: Do you think that extracting natural gas from shale in the United States should or should not be allowed?: 
(1) Deﬁnitely should be allowed; (2) Probably should be    allowed; 
 
 
3 YouGov uses targeted quota sampling as opposed to random probability sampling. The software looks at all surveys that currently need panel members, and calculates how many 
people to send invites to every 30 min. Panel members are selected to meet certain survey requirements regarding sociodemographic characteristics. Sampling frames are drawn according 
to the population being researched, and will generally contain the same target quotas as desired by the research. 
4   The US survey was not limited to the questions directly comparable   between 
the US and UK but also explored a range of issues within the US. Because shale  gas drilling often occurs in places of relatively low population density, a simple random sample would 
have identiﬁed very few individuals living within or near a shale gas play. We were interested in views among Marcellus Shale respondents in particular. As such, our initial sample 
included an oversample of residents living within the states of New York and Pennsylvania. We recognize, however, that such an oversample reduces our ability to compare the US and 
UK at a national level. We therefore re-weighted our sample proportionately to account for the oversampling within the Marcellus shale region: Pennsylvania and New York respondents 
were re- weighted by 0.26 and 0.38, respectively, to account for their relative oversampling proportionate to their representation in the US population. 
 
(3) Probably should NOT be allowed; (4) Deﬁnitely should NOT be allowed; (5) Don’t know. Following common practice (e.g. [48]),  the ﬁrst 4 
response options were compressed into 2 categories that matched that those from the UK; “deﬁnitely” and “probably” should be allowed were 
combined into “should be allowed”, and deﬁnitely” and “probably” should not be allowed were combined into “should not be allowed”. This allowed 
us to preserve the nuance of the attitudinal item for US based study, while maintaining comparability with the response items in the UK  study. 
As our second research question addressed correlates of knowledge, we relate answering the knowledge question correctly to respondent socio-
demographic attributes (e.g., gender, education, political ideology, and others), connectivity to the industry (region of residence, and in the US case, 
whether one had a lease on  his/her property). Although we were interested in the relation- ship between information sources and knowledge, we were 
unable to ask directly comparable items across the two surveys: the UK version of the survey only asked questions about what particular print media 
sources (all UK based) were read in general. Clearly, replicating these items in the US would not have provided useful information, so we only explore 
socio-demographic   correlates. 
 
4. Results 
 
4.1. What is the level of knowledge about shale gas development, and how does it differ between the general population of the US and the UK? 
 
UK respondents demonstrated far higher knowledge (as indicated by answering the item correctly) than US respondents. Among US respondents, 
33% answered correctly, 40% said that they did not know, and 27% answered incorrectly (Table 2). In the UK, 72% answered correctly, 19% said they 
did not know and only 9% answered incorrectly. 
 
4.2. What are the socio-demographic attributes associated with knowledge? 
 
For both the US and the UK, we explore socio-demographic correlates of knowledge. Respondent characteristics were not asked in precise parallel 
fashion (i.e., categories of income, education, etc. are not identical across the countries). Because of this lack of parallelism, and because it represents 
a relatively small portion of our analysis, we do not formally compare predictive models across the two study sites. Rather, we explore these 
relationships via simple correlational analysis. Within the US, answering correctly was positively associated (p < .05 for all variables listed below) 
with being male, older, more educated, having higher family income, living in  a region where shale gas development was viewed as a salient topic (as 
deﬁned by residing in a state with active shale gas development, or in a state [for example, New York] with intense media scrutiny and debate about 
whether development should move forward). There was also a surprisingly modest, but signiﬁcant at p < .05 relationship (r = .055) between 
knowledge and holding a current oil or gas lease on one’s property (Table 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Correlates with Knowledge (answering correctly), US and UK. 
 
US Respondents UK Respondents 
 
 Pearson Sig (p<)  Pearson Sig (p<)  
Gender −.196 .001  −.126 .000  
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Age .073 .01  .081 .01  
Education .185 .001  .142 .001  
Income .102 .001  .116 .001  
Political Ideology 
Live in shale state 
−.005 
.122 
ns 
.001 
 n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
n/a 
 
Current lease .055 .05  n/a n/a  
 
 
Table 4 
Differences in Support/Opposition between the US and the UK. 
 
 UK US 
Support 43.5% 58.9% 
Oppose 27.4% 24.5% 
Don’t know 29.1% 16.6% 
 
 
The UK results followed a similar pattern to those observed      in the US. Increased knowledge was seen for (p < .05, for all relationships listed) 
older respondents, men, those with more income, and more education (while acknowledging that the particular categories for income and education 
were not a precise match). Political ideology was not asked in a way comparable to the US (on a conservative/liberal spectrum), and questions about 
living in an area with an active shale gas play and having a lease on one’s property were not applicable to the UK context.  
 
4.3. What is the overall level of support for shale gas development, and how does it differ between the general population of the US and 
the UK? 
 
US respondents were overall much more supportive of shale gas development than UK residents (Table 4). A fairly sizeable majority (59%) of US 
respondents support shale gas development, compared to only 44% in the UK. Some caution must be taken here; it is not that UK residents are more likely 
to oppose development; opposition levels are actually quite similar across the two study sites (27% of UK residents and 25% of US respondents oppose 
development). Rather, US respondents are much less likely than those from the UK to say that they do not know whether they support or oppose (17% 
vs 29%), raising interesting questions about the relationship between development trajectory and  familiarity. 
 
4.4. What is the relationship between knowledge and support and how does it differ between the general population of the US and the UK? 
 
We conducted a simple crosstab analysis within each country to explore this question (Table 5). We see a very different relationship between support 
and knowledge across the two study sites: answering the knowledge question correctly is associated with increased support for development in the UK. 
Those who answered correctly are twice as likely to support shale gas development (50.4%) as those who answered incorrectly5 (25.3%). We also 
observe an important effect on ‘don’t know’ whether to support or oppose: UK respondents who answered incorrectly or did not know 
 
 
5 We had considered disaggregating the “don’t know” responses from the incorrect responses, but the response patterns vis-à-vis support/opposition were very similar, thus we chose to 
combine    them. 
were more than twice as likely than those who answered correctly to say they did not know (53% vs 20%) whether they supported or opposed shale 
gas  development. 
A very different effect is observed in the US: there is no effect on support of answering correctly versus incorrectly/don’t know. We observe fairly 
strong support overall (about 60% of respondents), but this ﬁgure scarcely differs between those who answered correctly (61.4%) and those who did 
not (57.6%). Counter to what was found in the UK, answering correctly was associated with (relatively) more opposition than the support: 32% who 
answered correctly were opposed, versus 21% of those incorrectly answering. Finally, only 22% of US respondents with relatively low knowledge 
(answered incorrectly or stated “don’t know”) stated that they did not know whether they supported or opposed shale gas development. This stands 
in stark contrast to what was found in the UK, where over 50% of those with low knowledge in the UK stated that they did not know whether they 
supported or opposed development. Only 7% of US respondents who answered correctly stated that they did not know whether to support or oppose, 
versus 20% in the UK; in the UK, knowledge can still manifest in attitudinal uncertainty. 
 
 
5. Discussion 
 
Robust differences exist between the US and UK respondents. We found higher levels of knowledge (answering the screener question correctly) 
about the shale gas industry in the UK than      in the US, but higher levels of support in the US (opposition levels were similar across the two samples, 
but US respondents were much less likely than UK respondents to say that they did not know whether they supported or opposed development). 
Regarding the relationship between knowledge and support, we see that increased knowledge in the UK is associated with increased sup- port, while 
knowledge was unrelated to support in the US. UK respondents who did not answer the knowledge question correctly were very likely to say they did 
not know whether they supported or opposed development—it seems eminently reason- able that those who had incorrect information or realized they 
did not know the answer did not express strong support or opposition. In stark contrast, more than half of the US respondents who did not answer 
correctly supported development. 
At this point it becomes reasonable to reﬂect on the adequacy of the knowledge question (correctly associating hydraulic fracturing/‘fracking’ with 
‘shale gas’) as reﬂecting knowledge. It seems sensible that anyone with a basic working knowledge of this topic would almost certainly be able to 
make this basic association; therefore, it is a good proxy for (at least limited) knowledge. This simple measure reveals nothing about the process by 
which people become informed. It is also possible that the “shale gas” language resonates differently across the contexts, contributing to the results. 
The term ‘shale gas’ is virtually always used when dis- cussing hydraulic fracturing in the UK. In media coverage, the two are nearly interchangeable, 
even when technically inaccurate (e.g., hydraulic fracturing for coal bed methane) [25]. In the US, Evensen et al. [14] have noted a greater pluralism 
of terminology, with the term “fracking” often used to denote the entire process of shale gas development. We do not wish to over-speculate on this 
possibility as the “shale gas” parlance is quite recognizable in the US as well [2]; future research certainly could explore the effects of experimentally 
varying the wording in survey instruments [9] did so on   a US-focused study). 
That US respondents are only half as likely as those from the  UK to say that they do not know whether they support or oppose further development 
raises interesting questions about the relationship  between  the  trajectory  of  shale  gas  development    and 
6  
 
Table 5 
Support and Knowledge, US and UK. 
 
 UK Respondents  Us Respondents   
 Answered Correctly Did not Answered Correctly Did not  
Support 50.4% 25.3% 61.4% 57.6%  
Oppose 29.4% 22.0% 31.8% 20.8%  
Don’t know 20.1% 52.7% 6.8% 21.5%  
UK      
Pearson Chi-Square 404.4, 3df  p < .001   
Phi/Cramer’s V (Effect size) .325     
US      
Pearson Chi-Square 51.4, 3df  p < .001   
 Phi/Cramer’s V (Effect size)  .201   
 
knowledge. Setting aside the possibility that this represents a more general cultural pattern of US survey respondents being less willing to admit to lack 
of knowledge, this ﬁnding also could be attributed to longer more extensive history of development in the US leading to familiarity. However, Stedman 
et al. [46] found the opposite (longer pattern of development correlated to lower self-assessed knowledge) in their comparisons between New York 
and Pennsylvania. Further, such a conclusion seems not in keeping with the ﬁnding that less knowledge is related to greater support among US 
respondents, nor that 72% answered the knowledge question correctly in the UK, whilst only half that number (36%) answered it  correctly in the US. 
In turning back to the questions motivating our research, the information deﬁcit/educating the public model, so oft castigated   in academic research, 
seems – even with admittedly limited data 
– to hold up reasonably well in the UK: simply put, those who answer the question correctly are more supportive of industry. This is the classic model 
promulgated by those who suggest the need to “educate the public” about risky technologies such as shale gas development, and  is consistent with 
publically articulated national level policy around shale gas development in the UK. Several caveats are important to engage. First, as we have 
described, our measures of how people become informed are somewhat limited by the data at hand. Further research is needed in this area. In the UK, 
in particular, we only had data available on the readership of particular newspapers in general (rather than other potential sources of information that 
might have been part of concerted efforts in the UK to educate people about science in general and shale gas in particular). Given the emphasis put on 
educating the UK public about science and technology, research reﬂecting more nuance on where people receive such information is crucial. Second, 
the data in our study are limited in that we can only make   our assessments here with single point in time information rather than conducting a 
longitudinal analysis or experiment where we would be able to view the effect of additional information on knowledge and support (as did Stedman et 
al. [54]). Again, we urge that other researchers carry forward this line of inquiry as the industry develops in both the US and the UK. 
Further, consistent with our expectations emerging from the relative centralization of governance and discourse – much more concentrated and 
purposeful in the UK – evidence supporting the information deﬁcit model is notably absent for US respondents, where those not answering correctly 
were disproportionately likely to support further development. Why does a relative lack of knowledge translate into support rather than opposition (or, 
more reasonably, at least uncertainty, as is seen in the UK data)? From the standpoint of the data we have available, we cannot trace the source of this 
difference. We might ask whether there is something qualitatively different about the nature of the information that people have access to—information 
perhaps with a more positive valence in the UK, as suggested by the rhetoric from the Cameron administration and related efforts to engender support. 
The centralized assurance found in the UK that the science around shale gas development is sound and that the technology is safe is notably absent in 
the US, where there is no strong central reassuring voice. Rather, we see a near cacophony of claims and counter-claims about the safety, beneﬁts, and 
harms of the industry. 
Finally, it is also reasonable to surmise that the previously dis- cussed media linkage between shale gas development and jobs, economic 
prosperity, and energy independence resonates strongly, perhaps disproportionately so, among those relatively less knowledgeable. That US 
respondents who expressed low knowledge were still willing to express an opinion, and a supportive one at that, could indicate that they are 
disproportionately focused on potential beneﬁts, rather than risks, of shale gas development, and that these views are not strongly tied to knowledge. 
Other research using this data set (name withheld for blind review, 2016) supports this claim, indicating that on the whole, US respondents were 
more likely than UK respondents to associate shale gas with positive outcomes such as cheap energy, clean energy, and energy security; UK 
respondents were more likely to associate shale gas with negative outcomes such as earthquakes. The source of these associations deserves further 
exploration with additional items that test the dimensionality of attitudes, and the source of  knowledge. 
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